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On the other hand—a worse fault and the only one we find in the book that is at all serious—his presentation falls short at one point of what his task would seem to call for in any view whatever. It is somewhat onesided and “northern”, not in temper or purpose, in both which respects it is commendably broad, but in matter. The extreme and dangerous “bumptiousness” of the freedmen as a cause of Southern troubles is not sufficiently described or emphasized. Also too little effort is made to present from the inside the Southern whites’ reaction; to show how their rise from the stupor of defeat and the menace of black rule was inspired, stimulated, guided, organized—the “underground work” of all sorts that must have been performed in homes, shops, stores, lodges, clubs and other private circles to have led Southern Saxondom to its victorious rally against threatening barbarism. Materials for such a portrayal are no doubt difficult to gather. They exist, however, and can be reached. A chapter or two of this nature displaying the historian’s power as the actual book does would much enhance its value, already great and lasting.

E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS.

*The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba.* In three volumes. By Captain HERBERT H. SARGENT, U. S. A. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company. 1907. Pp. xii, 274; 236; 268.)

THE first of these volumes contains, besides a short preface by the author, a discussion of the strategic problem, including a consideration of the relative strength of the Spanish and American navies and the state of our coast defenses; a historical review of the British descents upon the island of Cuba in 1741 and 1762; and an account of the operations of the American fleet up to the blockading of Cervera’s fleet in Santiago harbor. The second volume describes the military and naval operations from the sailing of the Fifth Corps under Shafter to the destruction of Cervera’s fleet off Santiago. The third volume contains one chapter devoted to the siege and capitulation of Santiago and the re-embarkation of the Fifth Corps, and one of eighty pages made up of general comments on recent changes in the military art, the fortune of war, the military policy of the United States, the navy and the army. The remaining eighty-four pages are appendixes. These are followed by an index, from which such important words as Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Insurgents, Insurrection, Volunteers (except Spanish) are omitted.

Each chapter ends with a section entitled Comments. These, together with the chapter on General Comments, are nearly equal in volume to the narrative portion of the work; together with the appendixes they exceed the narrative portion. The text is illustrated with a dozen excellent maps, which, though they do not generally represent the troops, enable the reader to follow the narrative without difficulty.

The work is dedicated to Elihu Root, "in admiration of what he did for the improvement of our little army when he was secretary of war". The author has not set forth the shortcomings of the army before the war in a way to impress the reader with the magnitude of the reform to which he refers in his dedication: He seems disposed to avoid or disregard the faults and defects of the old army and the old militia. Referring to the *ante bellum* training of the army, he says: "it was carefully and persistently drilled; and as far as circumstances would permit, practised in field manœuvres and tactical problems, under conditions resembling as nearly as possible those of actual war. . . . The majority of the officers, too, impelled by a sense of duty, and a love for their profession, had through hard work, become highly proficient in their duties. . . . Fortunate is the nation that can always in time of peril command the services of as able and highly-trained officers as were those of the United States army at the beginning of the Spanish-American War." One might think from these statements that there was not much in the army to reform, that it was pretty well governed and administered. No, the army was not practised in field exercises as far as circumstances would permit; and while the officers who had attained a high degree of proficiency in their duties may have constituted a numerical majority of those on the army list, their number may be considered as overbalanced by the rank of those who were sadly deficient in attainments. These higher officers in many cases could not have become proficient by any amount of work. They had not the troops, the *terrain*, the supplies, in short, the means of gaining the practise necessary to the attainment of proficiency. The author is silent on the rampant nepotism and political influence that governed for a time the appointment of officers to the volunteer army. He says nothing about the "embalmed beef" and the war investigating commission, about the difference between Sampson and Shafter as to the plan of co-operation agreed upon; he exhibits, but refrains from characterizing, General Wheeler's violation of orders in marching his division ahead of Lawton's, and bringing on the engagement of Las Guasimas. He passes lightly over the discreditable behavior of the 71st N. Y. at San Juan. Regarding the questionable tactics of the 33d Michigan, he says: "This attack was intended merely as a feint for the purpose of detaining the Spaniards at Aguadores, and thus preventing any of them from reënforcing Linares." But he does not tell us whether the attack accomplished this purpose or was executed in a form, or with a spirit, suited to its accomplishment. The Sampson-Schley controversy is not mentioned.

On the other hand, he describes and discusses the grand strategy and tactics of the campaign with great clearness, showing a strong grasp of his subject in all its aspects, naval, military, historical, geographical, statistical, etc. The works that have appeared heretofore, treating of the Spanish-American War, have been seriously defective in their

numerical data. The work before us is about perfect in this respect. In addition to the figures distributed through the text, we find in the appendixes a wealth of statistics on the campaign, obtained through the State Department from the Spanish government. These are invaluable to the student of the war, and are probably nowhere else to be found published together. Among the other valuable tables in the appendixes is one of distances in nautical miles and in statute miles between important points in the theatre of war, and a statement of the casualties in Shafter's army by regiment. One of these documents, however, appendix X., is likely to prove misleading. It consists of a table and comments taken from an article in the *North American Review*. The table gives the several wars in which the United States has been engaged and for each of these a row of statistics under the headings Regulars, Militia, etc., Opponents, Cost, Pensions. There is nothing to indicate whether the figures under the first three headings stand for naval as well as land forces, or whether those under the last two headings cover the naval as well as the land expenditures, as they may be presumed to do; nor whether those under the first two headings stand for men in the service at any particular time, or for men enlisted in the course of the war, or for enlistments (including re-enlistments) during the war.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the American authorities did not know even approximately the number of troops in Cuba. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee testified before a Senate committee that there were probably ninety-seven or ninety-eight thousand Spanish soldiers in the island. General Miles came nearer the truth, estimating the number at one hundred and fifty thousand. When Shafter landed in Cuba with his 16,887 officers and men, the Spanish troops in the island, regular and irregular, numbered about 200,000, and those in the province of Santiago 36,582; the Cuban insurgents in the island numbered but about 15,000, and those in the province of Santiago about 5,000. Of the latter, about 1,000 joined General Shafter and co-operated directly, but not very actively, with him. Yet, with these tremendous odds against them, the Americans outnumbered their opponents in two of the three engagements that took place—the attack of El Caney and the attack of San Juan. The former, only, was seriously resisted. Here the Spaniards numbered about 600, the American more than 6,000. General Lawton had engaged to take the place in a couple of hours, and was kept at it from half past six in the morning until about half past four in the afternoon, the enemy having lost in killed and wounded 49 per cent. of his strength, including the gallant General Vara de Rey, in command. The American loss was 7 per cent. of the force engaged. The emergency justified a heavier loss, and called for more vigorous tactics on the part of the offensive. Had General Lawton been “as far as circumstances would permit, practised in field

manceuvres and tactical problems, under conditions resembling as nearly as possible those of actual war", he would not have spent ten hours in carrying a position, with a preponderance in infantry of ten to one, and in artillery of four pieces to none, over the enemy. The artillery supporting the attack was but a fourth of the force accompanying the expedition. Being short of ammunition before the action commenced, it fired only intermittently; and with black powder at that.

The battle of San Juan was little else than an outpost affair. The Spanish forces actually engaged numbered about 1,200 officers and men. Practically all the fighting, says the author, was done by the first line, which consisted of about 521 officers and men. The American forces actually engaged numbered about 8,400 officers and men.

Las Guasimas was a rear-guard action in which the Spaniards numbered 1,500 and the American 964. "The records show", says Captain Sargent, "that the Spanish general had no intention of making a determined stand there. . . . It is clear now that if General Wheeler had not pushed forward so hurriedly from Siboney, no engagement would have taken place at Las Guasimas. . . . But at the time, it appeared to the Americans that the Spaniards at Las Guasimas were very anxious to maintain their position; and the fact that they were apparently driven back after two or three hours of determined fighting greatly encouraged the American troops."

Captain Sargent is the author of a history of *Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign* and of *The Campaign of Marengo*. The distinction which he has justly earned from these works is likely to be enhanced by the popular appreciation in store for *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*.

JOHN BIGELOW, JR.

*History of the Canal System of the State of New York*, together with Brief Histories of the Canals of the United States and Canada. In two volumes. [Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer and Surveyor, 1905.] By NOBLE E. WHITFORD, Resident Engineer. (Albany: State Legislative Printer. 1906. Pp. viii, 1025; vi, 1029-1547.)

THE author has here presented a voluminous history of the canal system of New York. The text is based largely upon canal reports and assembly documents. The authorities have manifestly been very closely followed—too closely at times for the best results. The unceasing quotation in great length from the opinions of engineers, auditors and governors, and the annalistic form rather weary and confuse the reader. However, the work is probably what the author would claim it to be—a documentary history of the building, enlarging and improving of the canals from the beginning to the recent decision for a barge canal system. The fact that the author is an engineer determines that great attention has been given to the minutiae of canal improvement